• Medientyp: E-Artikel
  • Titel: The Extension of Credit with Nonexclusive Contracts and Sequential Banking Externalities
  • Beteiligte: De Giorgi, Giacomo; Drenik, Andres; Seira, Enrique
  • Erschienen: American Economic Association, 2023
  • Erschienen in: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200220
  • ISSN: 1945-7731; 1945-774X
  • Schlagwörter: General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen:
  • Beschreibung: <jats:p> Nonexclusive sequential borrowing can increase default and impose externalities on prior lenders. We document that sequential banking is pervasive with substantial effects. Using credit card applications from a large bank and data on the applicants’ entire loan portfolios, we find that an additional credit line causes a 5.9 percentage point decline in default for high-score borrowers on previous loans. However, for low-score borrowers, it causes a 19 percentage point increase. The former use the new credit to smooth payments on preexisting loans, while the latter increase their total debt. These results have implications for “ no-universal-default” regulation and financial inclusion. (JEL D62, D82, G21, G51) </jats:p>