Erschienen:
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 2010
Erschienen in:
Mathematics of Operations Research, 35 (2010) 4, Seite 742-755
Sprache:
Englisch
ISSN:
1526-5471;
0364-765X
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
We prove that every multiplayer perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semicontinuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille [Solan, E., N. Vieille. 2003. Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games. J. Math. Econom. 39 911-929], which shows that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semicontinuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.