Sie können Bookmarks mittels Listen verwalten, loggen Sie sich dafür bitte in Ihr SLUB Benutzerkonto ein.
Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
Redundancy Payments and Firm-Specific Training: A Comment
Beteiligte:
Chiang, Shin-Hwan
Erschienen:
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1991
Erschienen in:Economica
Sprache:
Englisch
ISSN:
1468-0335;
0013-0427
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<p>Booth and Chatterji (1989) show that, with firm-specific human capital, workers bear a part of the training costs and consequently receive positive redundancy payments if dismissed. Such contracts are proven to yield negative profits and hence are not viable. The correct contracts require the firm to pay the second-period workers their expected productivity. With positive redundancy payments, workers not only bear the entire costs of training, but also cross-subsidize those who are laid off in the second period. The standard cost-sharing result does not hold in their model.</p>