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Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
Unions and Efficient Training
Beteiligte:
Booth, Alison L.;
Chatterji, Monojit
Erschienen:
Blackwell Publishers, 1998
Erschienen in:The Economic Journal
Sprache:
Englisch
ISSN:
1468-0297;
0013-0133
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<p>The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. The firm has ex post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers' wages below the social optimum. The emergence of a trade union bargaining at the firm-level can increase social welfare, by counterbalancing the firm's ex post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union-firm wage bargaining ensures that the post-training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the social optimum.</p>