Agarwal, Nikhil
[Author]
;
Featherstone, Clayton R.
[Other];
Azevedo, Eduardo
[Other];
Ashlagi, Itai
[Other];
Karaduman, Ömer
[Other]National Bureau of Economic Research
Published:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2018
Published in:NBER working paper series ; no. w24775
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource
Language:
English
DOI:
10.3386/w24775
Identifier:
Reproduction note:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Origination:
Footnote:
Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files
Description:
We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from traditional market failures that can be fixed to increase transplants by 25%-55%. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient: most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals do not internalize their patients' benefits from exchange, and current mechanisms sub-optimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we estimate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires a combined approach using new mechanisms and solving agency problems