Market Failure in Kidney Exchange

Medientyp: E-Book

Titel: Market Failure in Kidney Exchange

Beteiligte: Agarwal, Nikhil [Verfasser:in]; Featherstone, Clayton R. [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Azevedo, Eduardo [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Ashlagi, Itai [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Karaduman, Ömer [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]

Körperschaft: National Bureau of Economic Research

Erschienen: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2018

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.3386/w24775

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Reproduktionsnotiz: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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Anmerkungen: Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files

Beschreibung: We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from traditional market failures that can be fixed to increase transplants by 25%-55%. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient: most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals do not internalize their patients' benefits from exchange, and current mechanisms sub-optimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we estimate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires a combined approach using new mechanisms and solving agency problems

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