• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Corporate diversification and the cost of capital
  • Contributor: Hann, Rebecca N. [Author]; Ogneva, Maria [Author]; Ozbas, Oguzhan [Author]
  • Published: Stanford, Calif.: Univ., Rock Center for Corporate Governance, 2011
  • Published in: Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance: Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University working paper series ; 58
  • Extent: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 49, 14 S., 257,55 KB)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1364481
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: Managervergütung ; Mathematische Optimierung ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Suchtheorie ; Theorie ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
  • Description: We examine whether organizational form matters for a firm's cost of capital. Contrary to conventional view, we argue that coinsurance among a firm's business units can reduce systematic risk through the avoidance of countercyclical deadweight costs. We find that diversified firms have on average a lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios of standalone firms. In addition, diversified firms with less correlated segment cash flows have a lower cost of capital, consistent with a coinsurance effect. Holding cash flows constant, our estimates imply an average value gain of approximately 5% when moving from the highest to the lowest cash flow correlation quintile
  • Access State: Open Access