• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Corporate diversification and the cost of capital
  • Beteiligte: Hann, Rebecca N. [Verfasser:in]; Ogneva, Maria [Verfasser:in]; Ozbas, Oguzhan [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: Stanford, Calif.: Univ., Rock Center for Corporate Governance, 2011
  • Erschienen in: Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance: Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University working paper series ; 58
  • Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 49, 14 S., 257,55 KB)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1364481
  • Identifikator:
  • Schlagwörter: Managervergütung ; Mathematische Optimierung ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Suchtheorie ; Theorie ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
  • Beschreibung: We examine whether organizational form matters for a firm's cost of capital. Contrary to conventional view, we argue that coinsurance among a firm's business units can reduce systematic risk through the avoidance of countercyclical deadweight costs. We find that diversified firms have on average a lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios of standalone firms. In addition, diversified firms with less correlated segment cash flows have a lower cost of capital, consistent with a coinsurance effect. Holding cash flows constant, our estimates imply an average value gain of approximately 5% when moving from the highest to the lowest cash flow correlation quintile
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang