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Belli, Paolo [Author] ; World Bank Development Research Group Public Economics

How adverse selection affects the health insurance market

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  • Media type: E-Book
  • Title: How adverse selection affects the health insurance market
  • Contributor: Belli, Paolo [Author]
  • Corporation: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
  • Published: Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics, 2001
    Online-Ausg.
  • Published in: Policy research working paper ; 2574
  • Extent: Online-Ressource
  • Language: English
  • Keywords: Adverse selection (Insurance) Mathematical models ; Health insurance Mathematical models ; Managed care plans (Medical care) Mathematical models
  • Reproduction series: World Bank E-Library Archive
  • Type of reproduction: Online-Ausg.
  • Reproduction note: Also available in print
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: "March 2001"--Cover
    Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31)
    Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 13, 2002
  • Description: There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers