• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: How adverse selection affects the health insurance market
  • Beteiligte: Belli, Paolo [Verfasser:in]
  • Körperschaft: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
  • Erschienen: Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics, 2001
    Online-Ausg.
  • Erschienen in: Policy research working paper ; 2574
  • Umfang: Online-Ressource
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • Schlagwörter: Adverse selection (Insurance) Mathematical models ; Health insurance Mathematical models ; Managed care plans (Medical care) Mathematical models
  • Reproduktionsreihe: World Bank E-Library Archive
  • Art der Reproduktion: Online-Ausg.
  • Reproduktionsnotiz: Also available in print
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: "March 2001"--Cover
    Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31)
    Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 13, 2002
  • Beschreibung: There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers