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<jats:sec><jats:title><jats:bold>Abstract</jats:bold></jats:title><jats:p>Something Aristotle calls ‘right<jats:italic>logos</jats:italic>’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘<jats:italic>logos</jats:italic>’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the<jats:italic>Laws—</jats:italic>in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian<jats:italic>phronēsis</jats:italic>, like his and Plato’s<jats:italic>technē</jats:italic>and<jats:italic>epistēmē</jats:italic>, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, accounts that identify the right action and say why it is right. Arguably, Aristotelian rationality is a matter of being able to grasp accounts in general.</jats:p></jats:sec>