Sie können Bookmarks mittels Listen verwalten, loggen Sie sich dafür bitte in Ihr SLUB Benutzerkonto ein.
Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos
Beteiligte:
Moss, Jessica
Erschienen:
Brill, 2014
Erschienen in:
Phronesis, 59 (2014) 3, Seite 181-230
Sprache:
Nicht zu entscheiden
DOI:
10.1163/15685284-12341266
ISSN:
1568-5284;
0031-8868
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
AbstractSomething Aristotle calls ‘rightlogos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially theLaws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelianphronēsis, like his and Plato’stechnēandepistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, accounts that identify the right action and say why it is right. Arguably, Aristotelian rationality is a matter of being able to grasp accounts in general.